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I. ST ATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal is related to the summary judgment order dismissing Appellant Tina 
Venable's ("Venable") claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy in her 
employment action against Respondent Internet Auto Rent & Sales Inc. ("Internet Auto"). 
Venable's case included several causes of action related to her termination from employment in 
April 2011. Internet Auto has successfully defended all claims, either on summary judgment or 
at trial. Despite the summary dismissal of the wrongful discharge claim, Venable has twice 
moved for reconsideration of the district court's decision, to no avail. Venable now asks the 
Supreme Court to search the record for sufficient evidence showing she engaged in protected 
activity to justify overturning the summary judgment order. 
B. Background Facts and Procedural History 
1. Separation from Employment 
Internet Auto is an automobile dealership located in Ada County, who hired Venable in 
March 2011 to serve as the Internet Manager for automobile sales via the company's internet 
website. (R. Vol. 1., p. 372.) Approximately a month and a half after hiring Venable, Internet 
Auto terminated her employment on April 21, 2011. (Id. at 372-73.) Internet Auto's Employee 
Termination Form of same date simply stated the reason for separation was that Venable's 
"services [were] no longer needed." (Id. at 256; PI. Trial Ex. 2.) The Idaho Department of 
Labor's Eligibility Determination Unemployment Insurance Claim form discloses that Internet 
Auto stated Venable "was not meeting [her] sales goals" and that Venable "agreed with [Internet 
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Auto's] reason for her discharged [sic] but stated that the employer had restricted her access to 
key programs that would allow her to generate more sales." (R., Vol. 1., p. 96; PI. Trial Ex. 3.) 
2. Venable's Allegations 
On October 6, 2011, Venable filed this lawsuit, initially alleging claims of breach of an 
employment contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, wrongful discharge 
in violation of public policy, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. (R., 
Vol. 1., pp. 15-21.) The Complaint alleged a list of eight categories of illegal or deceptive acts 
and practices that Venable claimed had occurred at the automobile dealership: 
o Internet Auto Rent & Sales illegally passed on acquisition fees to 
consumers which were in fact owed by the dealership and then 
illegally charged the consumer interest thereon; 
o Internet Auto Rent & Sales illegally charged for auto warranties in 
transactions where the consumer was purchasing the vehicle in the 
"As Is" condition; 
o Internet Auto Rent & Sales illegally charged for gap insurance in 
transactions where the consumer opted out of gap coverage 
(sometimes even charging double for gap insurance); 
o Internet Auto Rent & Sales falsely advertised vehicles "for sale" 
which did not even exist in the inventory and falsely 
misrepresented the history of pre-owned vehicles to consumers; 
o Internet Auto Rent & Sales sold vehicles to consumers in excess of 
their advertised prices; 
o Internet Auto Rent & Sales engaged in the deceptive practice of 
failing to disclose all material contractual and financial terms to 
consumers, engaging in what is known in the industry as "packed 
payments"; 
o Internet Auto Rent & Sales deceived consumers into believing the 
dealership had agreed to lower the sales price of units when in fact 
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it had only extended the term of the loan, and thereby reduced the 
monthly payment amount disclosed to the consumer; 
o Internet Auto Rent & Sales further deceived consumers by 
employing a variety of "bait and switch" tactics designed to trick 
consumers into believing they were to receive one vehicle only to 
then substitute it later for another vehicle of lesser quality and 
value. 
(Id. at 17-18, ~ 10.) After successfully moving the district court to set aside a default judgment, 
Internet Auto answered Venable's Complaint on April 11, 2012. (Id. at 23-27.) Venable's 
deposition was held on June 5, 2012, wherein she testified concerning the allegations in her 
Complaint, including the categories she listed in Paragraph 10 of her Complain. (See id. at 35, 
57-65.) 
3. Motion for Summary Judgment and First Motion for Reconsideration 
Based on Venable's deposition testimony, Internet Auto filed its Motion for Summary 
Judgment on July 10,2012, seeking dismissal of all claims in Venable's Complaint. (R., Vol. 1., 
pp. 29-30.) Concerning the wrongful discharge claim, Internet Auto argued that Venable could 
not support the claim because she failed to identify a statute or regulation being violated and 
failed to present sufficient evidence of the causal connection between her alleged refusal to 
participate and the termination. (Id. at 192-94.) Venable argued in opposition that the record 
clearly supported a claim for wrongful discharge, citing to her deposition as sufficient evidence 
of acting in furtherance of public policy and that the termination was motivated by such actions. 
(Id. at 262-66.) Following briefing in the Motion for Summary Judgment, Venable filed her First 
Amended Complaint on August 28, 2012, adding a claim for slander per se. (Id. at 281-88.) On 
September 12, 2012, the district court issued its decision dismissing the claims for breach of 
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contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and that part of the claim for negligent infliction of emotion distress related to medical 
conditions. (Id. at 306-15.) The district court reserved ruling on Venable's claim for wrongful 
discharge until additional discovery had been completed. (Id. at 315.) 
On December 27, 2012, Venable filed an affidavit in opposition to the summary 
judgment motion related to the wrongful discharge claim, stating her experience in the 
automobile sales industry; her observation of what she considered to be recognized "as unfair 
and deceptive business acts and practices" in the industry; her "good faith" belief that the acts 
and practices she allegedly observed were in violation of the industry standards and "Idaho 
consumer protection act and/or the Truth in Lending Act," listing eight practices similar to those 
identified in her Complaint and Amended Complaint; that her testimony regarding these 
practices during her deposition was from her personal knowledge and observations; that other 
affidavits in the record corroborated her testimony; that she reported the practices to Internet 
Auto's General Sales Manager; that soon after reporting these practices, her access to key 
programs was denied; and that she believed she was "fired" because she "refused to break the 
law." (Id. at 336-40.) 
The district court issued its decision, dismissing Venable's claim for wrongful discharge 
on January 30, 2013. (Id. at 372-81.) The court reviewed Venable's allegations and found "[a]s 
a matter of law these general references [of violated regulations] when coupled with the failure 
to identify specifically violated regulations or laws are insufficient to show that Venable was 
engaged in a protected activity." (Id. at 380.) It also found that "Venable has offered no 
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citations or argument as to how the alleged conduct violated the [regulations and statutes cited by 
Venable at oral argument] other than broad statements that it was somehow illegal without any 
specific detail or authority." (Id. at 381.) Further, after making all reasonable inferences in 
Venable's favor, the court stated she had "failed to produce evidence or show how the alleged 
acts were in any way unlawful." (Id.) 
One week later, Venable filed her Motion and Memorandum for Reconsideration of the 
Grant of Summary Judgment on the Claim for Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy. 
(Id. at 383-92.) She argued that she had adequately identified sources of public policy to invoke 
the at-will-employment exception and had produced "substantive" evidence showing the 
practices were unlawful under these sources, citing to her affidavit, deposition, and other 
affidavits and testimony in the record. (Id.) Internet Auto argued in opposition that Venable 
failed to establish that the practices allegedly complained of by Venable were actually unlawful. 
(Id. at 394-98.) The district court released its decision on the motion for reconsideration on 
February 27, 20l3, denying Venable's motion. (Id. at 409-15.) The district court reviewed all 
evidence related to each of the alleged acts and practices believed by Venable to be deceptive as 
listed in her Complaint and Amended Complaint, ruling on the admissibility and presence of 
evidence relating to each. 1 (Id.) The court's decision stated: 
This Court has reconsidered all of the evidence filed in support and 
opposition of the motion for summary judgment on Count II [wrongful discharge 
in violation of public policy]. . .. [T]he Court still does not find the Plaintiff has 
submitted specific admissible fact [sic] to show there is a genuine issue for trial 
I Venable has not disputed or challenged the decisions related to the admissibility of evidence on summary judgment 
and reconsideration in this appeal. 
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on the claims in Count II. [Venable's] allegations are conclusory and she must 
present more than a scintilla of evidence at this stage. [Venable's] case must be 
anchored in something more than speculation. While the 'more than a mere 
scintilla of evidence or slight doubt' standard is not a very high standard to meet, 
after the Court's first, second, and now third review of the evidence, [Venable] 
has not met this burden of demonstrating there is a material issue of fact as to any 
issues in Count II. 
(Id. at 415.) 
4. Trial Testimony 
Trial was held on March 11-15, 2013, on the remaining issues of slander per se and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. During trial, testimony was developed regarding issues 
related to the wrongful discharge claim, including the reason for Venable's termination from 
employment, deceptive sales practices, and Venable's restricted access to company computer 
programs. (See generally, Tr.) 
a. Reasons for Separation from Employment 
Internet Auto business manager Patricia Kennedy testified that the reason given to 
Venable for the termination was that her services were no longer needed. (Id. at p. 55, L. 17-19; 
p. 56, L. 5-11; p. 57, L. 19-24, p. 58, L. 9-12.) She also testified that the Department of Labor 
would not accept "services were no longer needed" as a reason for its unemployment benefits 
determination and that it needed a more specific answer, so she stated that Venable was not 
meeting sales goals. (Id. at p. 59, L. 12 - p. 60, L. 12.) Chris Plaza, the General Sales Manager 
during Venable's employment, testified that the reason he had been told for the termination was 
lack of production. (Id. at p. 334, L. 2-11.) 
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Former employee Joseph Winter, the individual that notified Venable of the termination, 
also testified at trial regarding the reason given to Venable at the time of termination, stating that 
it was because her "services [were] no longer needed." (Id. at p. 95, L. 11-17.) He also testified 
that in discussions prior to the termination, production was cited as the underlying reason. (ld. at 
p. 106, L. 3-18.) Former employee Rowan Sherman testified, in connection with the 
circumstances surrounding the alleged slander, that Venable was "let go because of her 
dishonesty and lack of integrity." (ld. at p. 11, L. 22-24.) Another former employee, Jeremiah 
Clemons testified that it was implied in a sales meeting that the reason Venable "was let go" was 
because "she had made something up for a customer or fabricated some numbers." (Id. at p. 210, 
L. 24 - p. 211, L. 4.) Finally, Venable testified that the only reason given for the termination at 
the time was that her services were no longer needed. (ld. at p. 125, L. 15 - p. 126, L. 22.) 
b. Restricted Access to Company Computer Programs 
Testimony during trial also included details related to the restriction on her access to the 
software programs that Venable claims resulted from her refusal to break the law. (See id. at p. 
123, L. 3-10.) One of the programs was Dealer Track, which allowed credit applications to be 
prepared and submitted to various financial institutions. Before Venable's access to Dealer 
Track was restricted, Wells Fargo personnel met with Internet Auto and asked that Venable not 
be permitted to submit deals to Wells Fargo. (T1'., p. 321, L. 22 - p. 324, L. 25.) Internet Auto 
then had a manager meeting and made a decision to restrict Venable's access to the program. 
(ld. at p. 325, L. 1 - p. 326, L. 7.) 
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In particular, Mr. Plaza testified that the Wells Fargo representative told him that she did 
not want Venable accessing the program because Venable had previously "kinked" deals with 
them in the past and did not want to look at any deals she submitted.2 (Jd. at p. 326, L. 11 - p. 
328, L. 15.) Mr. Plaza spoke directly with Venable regarding the decision to restrict her access 
to Dealer Track. (Jd. at p. 326, L. 16 - p. 331, L. 4.) At first, Mr. Plaza did not tell her the 
reason for the restricted access, but when Venable continued to question the decision openly he 
told her that the reason for the restricted access was that "Wells Fargo [had] a problem with [her] 
deals." (Jd. at p. 331, L. 5 - p. 333, L. 24.) He indicated that Wells Fargo was Intemet Auto's 
"predominant bank" at the time and they could not risk straining that relationship. (Jd. at p. 332, 
L. 11-19.) He told her that Wells Fargo spoke with Intemet Auto and indicated that Venable had 
kinked deals with them, and that Intemet Auto based its decision to forbid her to submit deals on 
its conversations with Wells Fargo. (Jd.) Mr. Plaza also testified that after informing Venable of 
this decision, Venable's behavior changed at work and that she became "negative that she felt 
like someone was throwing rocks at her," and that they had "affected [her] ability to make 
money." (Jd. at 333, L. 7-24.) 
Mr. Winter testified that he spoke with Mr. Plaza about Venable's restricted access after 
he inquired on behalf of Venable why she could not log-in to Dealer Track. (Jd. at p. 366, L. 3 -
p. 367, L. 6.) He was told that Wells Fargo would not do business with Intemet Auto if she was 
2 A kinked deal, or kinking a deal was explained by Venable at trial as a slang term used in the "car world" that 
"means to misrepresent the customers to the bank, to make up or actually produce false pay stubs, to falsify their 
credit application, to sign customers' names to documents they have no knowledge of, anything that is tangibly bad 
when you send information to a bank. That is what in the industry is called kinking a deal." (Tr., p. 173, L. 10-20.) 
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able to submit deals. (Id.) Another former employee, Mr. Heath, also testified that Venable's 
access to Dealer Track was cutoff. (Id. at p. 378, L. 2-12.) 
Venable herself gave testimony regarding her restricted access to the computer programs 
at Internet Auto. (Id. at p. 121, L. 5 - p. 123, L. 10.) She testified that she and Mr. Plaza "had a 
huge argument" over the fact her access was restricted. (Id.) She admitted that: 
A. You know, [Chris Plaza] - I remember him saying something about he -
something about a lender didn't like me or something. I didn't believe him. He 
was just retaliatory because I didn't like the way he was doing business, and I told 
him. 
(Id. at p. 123, L. 3-10.) 
c. Remaining Testimony at the Trial 
A majority of the remaining testimony at trial dealt with the circumstances surrounding a 
sales meeting where it was alleged Mr. Plaza spoke disparaging words about Venable relative to 
her termination arising from her not being honest and having integrity. (See generally, Tr.) 
Internet Auto produced substantial evidence that Venable had indeed kinked deals with Wells 
Fargo and its predecessor in the past (see, e.g., Tr. p. 246, L. 16 - p. 247, L. 11; Def. Trial Ex. 
141), and had lied on the witness stand in a previous case. (Def. Trial Ex. 107, pp. 
Bronco00035-Bronco000036.) The jury reached a verdict, finding that Internet Auto had not 
breached its duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent the risk of emotional distress and that 
although during the sales meeting infOlmation impugning the honesty, integrity, virtue, or 
reputation of Venable was communicated, that the infonnation was actually true. (R., Vol. 1., pp. 
420-21.) In essence, the jury found that Mr. Plaza had told the sales staff in the meeting that 
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Venable was let go for kinking deals with a bank in the past and the fact that she had kinked 
deals in the past was true. 
5. Second Motion for Reconsideration 
Subsequent to the trial and verdict in favor of Internet Auto, Venable filed a second 
motion for reconsideration regarding the claim for wrongful discharge. (Jd. at 427-29.) Venable 
argued that the trial testimony of Mr. Plaza, Robert Heath, and Venable supported the fact that 
Venable had presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the 
wrongful discharge claim. (Jd.) She stated that the testimony included the testimony of Mr. 
Plaza stating the practice of packing payments was deceptive to the consumer and that the forms 
used by Internet Auto could not prohibit the practice. (Jd. at 428.) 
The district court denied the second motion for reconsideration in its decision dated April 
22, 2013. (Jd. at 437-42.) It analyzed whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to create a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding the wrongful discharge claim. (Jd.) The court ruled that 
even with the testimony from trial "in connection with all evidence the Court has already 
considered in its previous decisions," Venable had still "not submitted evidence that she was 
engaged in a protected activity by refusing to commit an unlawful act, nor that her telmination 
was in fact motivated by her participation in that activity." (Jd. at 440-41.) The court then stated 
a non-moving party's burden of proof on summary judgment and the requirement that it only 
consider admissible evidence. (Jd. at 441.) It went on to hold: 
Now, the court has the benefit of actually looking of not only what would 
be admissible at trial, but also what was admissible at trial. While the 
testimony at trial was that these witnesses knew and could describe what 
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'packed payments' were, the testimony elicited at trial was that 'packing 
payments' was not against the law in Idaho, that although 'packing payments' 
could be deceptive according to Mr. Plaza that Internet Auto did not engage in 
that practice, and Mr. Heath's admission on cross examination that any 
testimony on packed payments was speCUlative on his part. Ms. Venable's 
testimony was not sufficient to meet the Plaintiffs burden of showing 
sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. Merely citing a list 
of allegations and conclusions is not the same as presenting admissible evidence 
in support. '[A] mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts 
is not sufficient to create a genuine issue for purposes of summary judgment.' 
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party needs to 
present more than mere conclusory allegations and a scintilla of evidence to 
raise a genuine issue of fact. In review of all of the evidence, the Plaintiff still has 
not met her burden. 
(ld. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)) Subsequently, Venable filed her notice of appeal. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL: ATTORNEY FEES 
A. Whether Internet Auto is Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees and Costs on 
Appeal Pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Idaho Supreme C0U11 reviews an order for summary judgment applying the same 
standard of review that was used by the trial court in ruling on the motion for summary 
judgment. See Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 307, 160 P.3d 743, 746 
(2007). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving pat1y is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c); see also Taylor 
v. AlA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 558, 261 P.3d 829, 835 (2011). The moving party is 
entitled to a jUdgment as a matter of law when the non-moving party fails to establish the 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 11 24040-115/621369 
existence of an element essential to that party's case. Doe v. City of Elk River, 144 Idaho 337, 
338, 160 P.3d 1272, 1273 (2007). 
Where the basis for such a motion is that there exists no genuine issue of material fact 
concerning an element of the non-moving party's case, the non-moving party must establish an 
issue of fact regarding that element. Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 129 Idaho 171, 
175, 923 P.2d 416, 420 (1996). The non-moving patiy is required to submit more than 
conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists to establish a genuine issue of fact. 
BlickenstajJv. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 577, 97 P.3d 439, 444 (2004). A mere scintilla of evidence 
or only a slight doubt as to the facts is insufficient to withstand summary judgment; there must 
be sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably return a verdict for the party opposing 
the motion. Corbridge v. Clark Equipment Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986). 
On review, the Supreme Court will construe all disputed facts liberally in favor of the 
non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences will be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. 
Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church, 144 Idaho at 307, 160 P .3d at 746. However, a cOUli is not 
required to search the record for evidence that may create a genuine issue of material fact; the 
non-moving party must point the cOUli's attention to the evidence. Vreeken v. Lockwood 
Engineering, B. V, 148 Idaho 89,104,218 P.3d 1150,1164-65 (2009). If the non-moving party 
does not meet its burden, and "the evidence reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact, then 
all that remains is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review." Yoakum, 129 
Idaho at 175, 923 P.2d at 420. 
Also, a party against whom summary judgment IS granted is entitled under LR.C.P. 
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11 (a)(2)(B) to point the cOUli's attention to evidence in the record or provide new facts that 
would create a genuine issue of fact. Blackmore v. RelMax Tri-Cities, LLC, 149 Idaho 558, 563-
64, 237 P.3d 655, 660-61 (2010). When reviewing such a decision on a motion for 
reconsideration, this Court is to apply the same standard as on the underlying issue for which the 
moving party sought reconsideration: 
When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district cOUli must apply the 
same standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order 
that is being reconsidered. In other words, if the original order was a matter 
within the trial cOUli's discretion, then so is the decision to grant or deny the 
motion for reconsideration. If the original order was governed by a different 
standard, then that standard applies to the motion for reconsideration. Likewise, 
when reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for 
reconsideration, this Court utilizes the same standard of review used by the lower 
court in deciding the motion for reconsideration. 
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Properly Granted and Upheld Summary Judgment in Favor of 
Internet Auto on Venable's Claim of Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public 
Policy. 
1. Applicable Law and Legal Standards 
A "narrow exception" to the at-will employment presumption has been recognized in 
Idaho where the employer's motivation for a telmination of employment contravenes public 
policy. Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 640, 272 P.3d 
1263, 1271 (2012); Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 75 P.3d 733 
(2003); Watson v. Idaho Falls Consolidated Hospitals, 111 Idaho 44, 720 P.2d 632 (1986). "The 
purpose of the exception is to balance the competing interests of society, the employer, and the 
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employee in light of modern business experience." Edmondson, 139 Idaho at 176, 75 P.3d at 
737. This public policy exception to the at-will rule is "triggered only where an employee is 
terminated for engaging in some protected activity, which includes (1) refusing to commit an 
unlawful act, (2) performing an important public obligation, or (3) exercising certain legal rights 
and privileges." Bollinger, 152 Idaho at 640, 272 P.3d at 1271. "Whether an employee is 
engaged in a protected activity is a question of law. In determining whether an activity is 
protected, (Idaho courts analyze] (1) whether there is a public policy at stake sufficient to create 
an exception to at-will employment, and (2) 'whether the employee acted in a manner 
sufficiently in furtherance of that policy. '" Id. (citations omitted). The public policy exception 
has been triggered in cases where employees were discharged for refusing to commit perjury, 
filing worker's compensation claims, refusing to "date" a supervisor, and for serving on jury 
duty. See Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 118 Idaho 664, 668, 799 P.2d 70,74 (1990) (cases cited 
therein). 
The public policy claimed by the employee "generally must be rooted in the constitution, 
case law, or statutory language." Id.; Edmondson, 139 Idaho at 177, 75 P.3d at 738. "In the 
absence of case law or statutory language . . . , [Idaho courts find] no basis for expanding the 
Idaho law that defines the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine." Edmondson, 139 
Idaho at 177, 75 P.3d at 738 (citing Lord v. Swire Pacific Holdings, Inc., 203 F. Supp 2d. 1175, 
1180 (D. Idaho 2002). Where an employee alleges that he or she "is engaged in a protected 
activity and is subsequently terminated, the employee must also show that his or her termination 
was in fact motivated by his or her participation in that activity." Bollinger, 152 Idaho at 640, 
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272 P.3d at 1271. This question of causation is for the jury, although it may be decided as a 
matter of law where there exists no genuine issue of fact. Id. at 640-41, 272 P .3d at 1271-72 
(citing Thomas v. A1edical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 208, 61 P.3d 557, 565 
(2002)). 
2. Venable Presented Insufficient Evidence in Opposition to Summary 
Judgment. 
Venable argues on appeal that she has shown that she engaged in activity protected by the 
public policy exception to the "at-will" doctrine. (Appellant's Br., 18-21.) She has claimed that 
she refused to commit an unlawful act by refusing to participate in Internet Auto's alleged sales 
practices. However, the record lacks the evidence sufficient to overcome a motion for summary 
judgment related to the wrongful discharge claim. The record only contains conclusory 
assertions related to her claim. It does not contain even a scintilla of admissible evidence that the 
acts about which she allegedly complained were actually unlawful or that her employment was 
telminated because she either complained about those acts or that she refused to participate in 
them. 
a. Venable's allegations are conclusory and are not supported by 
evidence in the record. 
In support of her wrongful discharge claim, Venable states that "the record unequivocally 
reflects she reported to Internet Auto the fact the dealership was engaging in deceptive and 
unlawful acts and practices in violation of Idaho law." (Id. at 18.) Although she states the 
record "unequivocally" supp011s this fact, she can only point to her own conclusory testimony 
that these practices were unlawful. These conclusory allegations are contained in her Complaint 
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and deposition; Venable has not cited to any credible evidence to conoborate these mere 
allegations, or allegations that as a result of either complaining about the practices or refusing to 
practice them herself, her employment was then telminated. (See id. at 18-19.) Further, 
testimony at trial showed that the reason for the termination was for performance and integrity 
issues. 
In the opposition memorandum to summary judgment on the wrongful discharge claim, 
Venable only cites to her allegations in her Complaint, testimony in her deposition, and the 
termination form. (R., Vol. 1., pp. 262-66.) After briefing on the motion for summary judgment 
was completed and she had filed her Amended Complaint, she also filed the Affidavit of Robert 
William Heath which lists sales practices he was allegedly instructed to participate in-similar to 
Venable's categories of alleged acts Internet Auto practiced.3 (R., Vol. 1., pp. 296-98.) After the 
district court reserved ruling on the wrongful discharge claim to allow for additional discovery, 
Venable filed her affidavit pointing to her same conclusory allegations in the Complaint and her 
deposition. (Jd. at 336-39.) 
In support of her claim, Venable also speculates that allegedly in response to her 
complaints of, or refusal to practice, the deceptive acts, Internet Auto suspended her access to 
key sales programs. (Appellant's Br. at 19.) However, she had previously conceded the matter 
at the oral argument for her second motion for reconsideration. The district court's order 
denying her second motion for reconsideration specifically pointed out that she conceded that the 
3 At trial, Mr. Heath admitted that his testimony regarding whether Internet Auto practiced the alleged acts was pure 
speculation. (Tr., p. 387, L. 5-16.) 
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denial of access was not connected to her complaints to management. (R., Vol. 1., p. 440.) 
Without this evidence, Venable is reduced to relying on her own conclusory testimony that she 
was terminated because she complained to management regarding the deceptive acts and further 
refused to participate in such acts. 
Next, Venable speculates about the reasons for her telmination, but the testimony 
presented at trial, through Internet Auto's Business Manager, fOlmer General Sales Manager, and 
one former employee all testified that she was "let go" because either her services were no longer 
needed, or for unsatisfactory performance. (Tr., p. 55, L. 17-19; p. 56, L. 5-11; p. 57, L. 19-24, 
p. 58, L. 9-12; p. 95, L. 11-17; p. 106, L. 3-18; p. 334, L. 2-11.) The reasons given by two 
additional fOlmer employees for her termination from employment related to circumstances 
surrounding the Dealer Track restriction and dealings with Wells Fargo. (Jd. at p. 11, L. 22-24; 
p. 210, L. 24 - p. 211, L. 4.) Venable also testified herself that the reason given to her for the 
termination was that her services were no longer needed. (Jd. at p. 125, L. 15 - p. 126, L. 22.) 
Additionally, Venable only cites to self-serving testimony of vague assertions as support 
for her contention that Internet Auto was engaged in unlawful sales practices. The district court 
specifically reviewed all evidence in the record regarding the list of allegedly deceptive practices 
she had listed in her Complaint for its decision "denying Venable's first motion for 
reconsideration. (R., Vol. 1., pp. 410-15.) The court found nothing that could support Venable's 
opposition to summary judgment. (Jd.) The court reviewed Venable's complaint and deposition 
testimony and did not find any specific admissible fact to show a genuine issue for trial. (Jd. at 
415 ("The Plaintiffs allegations are conclusory and she must present more than a scintilla of 
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evidence at this stage. The Plaintiff's case must be anchored m something more than 
speculation.").) 
b. The evidence does not create a genuine issue of fact for trial because 
Venable has submitted no admissible evidence showing that Internet 
Auto's sales practices were unlawful during her employment. 
Further, Venable did not provide any admissible evidence that the practices allegedly 
complained of were unlawful. (See R., Vol. I., pp. 17 -18, ~ 10.) Protected activities include 
refusing to commit an unlawful act, performing an important public obligation, and exercising 
certain legal rights and privileges. See Bollinger, 152 Idaho at 640, 272 P.3d at 1271. Here, 
Venable argues that she engaged in protected activity because she refused to commit an unlawful 
act. She also argues on appeal that her reporting of violations to management was a performance 
of an important public obligation. Although Venable spends much of her argument on appeal 
saying she has identified a public policy to trigger the protections of the exception to at-will 
employment, the fact is she has failed to show, beyond her conclusory allegations, that these acts 
or violations even implicate public policy protection. The record does not include evidence that 
the practices were unlawful. 
Each of the district court's three decisions point out that Venable has failed to show that 
she participated in a protected activity. In the decision denying summary judgment, the court 
stated that "Venable has offered no citations or argument as to how the alleged conduct violated 
[Idaho or federal law] other than broad statements that it was somehow illegal without any 
specific detail or authority." (R., Vol. I., p. 381 (emphasis added).) In its decision denying her 
first motion for reconsideration, the court found that the list of categories of alleged unlawful 
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acts that Venable presented in her Complaint and to which she testified in her deposition, were 
"conclusory without specific information or evidence presented at summary judgment to support 
them." (Id. at 410.) 
The court went on to examine all evidence presented in support of each of the alleged 
unlawful practices and found for each allegation that there either was no admissible evidence to 
support her allegation, that there was no evidence in the record related to the allegation, or that 
Venable had failed to show how the practice was unlawful. (Id. at 411-13.) In conclusion, the 
court stated that Venable's allegations were conclusory and that her case "must be anchored in 
something more than speculation." (Id. at 415.) 
Finally, in the decision denying Venable's second motion for reconsideration, the court 
summarized its decision on summary judgment, stating Venable had "failed to produce evidence 
or show how certain acts at the center of the wrongful discharge claim were in any way unlawful 
as required under Idaho law." (Id. at 437.) It also stated that it considered whether testimony 
from the trial would create a genuine issue of material fact that Venable was asked to engage in 
unlawful acts, which would "establish[] the necessary alleged unlawful act." (Id. at 440.) In 
conclusion, the court found that "Venable still has not submitted evidence that she was engaged 
in a protected activity by refusing to commit an unlawful act, nor that her termination was in fact 
motivated by her participation in that activity." (Id. at 440-41.) 
Ultimately, her arguments on appeal are similar to the ones made in her Reply Brief in 
support of her second motion for reconsideration, where she argued that "[a]ll she has to show is 
that when Internet Auto asked her to deceive customers - she refused" and the court was 
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required to "acknowledge the evidence showing Venable refused to pack payments and refused 
to pass acquisition fees onto consumers." (R. Vol. I., p. 432.) However, she must first show that 
these alleged practices were unlawful. These mere allegations cannot make a genuine issue of 
fact for trial as she cannot show that any such alleged practices were actually unlawful. 
Accordingly, Venable has failed to produce sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. 
c. The evidence does not create a genuine issue of fact for trial because 
Venable has submitted no admissible evidence showing that her 
termination from employment was motivated by participation in a 
protected activity. 
Next, regardless of whether the Court were to find Venable has shown that she engaged 
in activity protected by public policy, the trial settled the fact that Venable's employment was 
terminated for reasons unconnected to her alleged complaints to management or her alleged 
refusal to participate in unlawful sales practices. Thus, Venable cannot meet an essential 
element of her claim because she cannot show that her termination from employment was 
motivated by her refusal to participate in allegedly unlawful acts. See Bollinger, 152 Idaho at 
640, 272 P.3d at 1271. Outside of the unsupported allegations in her complaint and mere 
allegations in her deposition testimony, the record does not contain any evidence that the 
termination was related to a refusal to participate in unlawful practices or even to alleged 
complaints of those practices. Venable is unable to present a persuasive argument on appeal that 
she was terminated for refusing to participate in unlawful practices because the actual testimony 
developed at trial supports an entirely different motivation for the termination. 
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Most of the testimony developed at trial relating to the termination stated that Venable's 
employment was terminated for reasons related to her production as a salesperson.4 (Tr., p. 55, 
L. 17-19; p. 56, L. 5-11; p. 57,19-24, p. 58, L. 9-12; p. 59, L. 12 -po 60, L. 12; p. 95, L. 11-17; 
p. 106, L. 3-18; p. 334, L. 2-11.) Basically, Venable's services were no longer needed because 
she could not meet her sales goals. (See id.) This testimony does not support an argument that 
the termination was motivated by Venable's alleged refusal to participate in unlawful tactics. 
The reasons are not related in any manner. The testimony relates to problems with her actual 
performance of her overall sales duties and not with a refusal to participate in particular sales 
practices that were allegedly unlawful. 
The fact that she has failed to present sufficient evidence to show she was telminated 
either for complaining to management about alleged unlawful practices or for refusing to 
participate in those practices is further illustrated by examining Ray v. Nampa School Dist. 131, 
120 Idaho 117, 814 P.2d 17. Unlike the plaintiff in Ray, Venable cannot make a showing that 
she was terminated for engaging in protected activity. The plaintiff in Ray claimed on appeal, 
inter alia, that the school district violated public policy by terminating his employment based on 
an argument that the school district's decision to telminate his employment as a maintenance 
electrician was based in part on the fact that he had reported safety violations to the state 
electrical engineer. Id. The plaintiff successfully defended against a summary judgment motion 
4 Other testimony from fOimer employees of Internet Auto suggested that the comments at the sales meeting stated 
that Venable was terminated from her employment because of her dishonesty and lack of integrity. (Tr., p. II, L. 
22-24; p. 210, L. 24 - p. 211, L. 4.) Even if that were part of the reason for the termination, Venable's argument on 
appeal would sti1l fail as it is unrelated to her argument that the determination was based on her refusal to pmticipate 
in unlawful sales practices. 
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with affidavits and deposition testimony. Id. His affidavit stated that he "learned his 
employment was terminated because he had reported certain safety code violations" to the state 
electrical engineer. Id. The deposition testimony of the district's Director of Services included a 
comment that the plaintiff was "fired because he had 'made contact with the state electrical 
engineer.'" Id. The Supreme Court ruled that this evidence raised a genuine issue of material 
fact, sufficient to "prevent entry of summary judgment" and reversed the district court's decision 
granting summary judgment. Id. 
In contrast, considering the evidence presented and cited by Venable to oppose the 
motion for summary judgment, it creates no genuine issue of material fact like the specific 
evidence cited in Ray. The plaintiff in Ray was able to learn that the reason for his termination 
was connected to the violations reported to the state electrical engineer and stated this conclusion 
in his affidavit. 5 However, Venable's affidavit before the court on summary judgment only 
speculates as to the reasons for her termination from employment; she has no supporting 
evidence for her claim. (R., Vol. I., p. 339, ~ 10 ("I believe I was fired because I refused to break 
the law.") (emphasis added).) In Ray, deposition testimony of the district's management directly 
supported the plaintiff s argument, whereas Venable's testimony evidence consists of only her 
own allegations. Additionally, the Ray decision found that the evidence presented in opposition 
to the motion for summary judgment contained supporting facts and was more than a "mere 
5 The Ray opinion does not elaborate on how the plaintiff learned this information or if the affidavit offered any 
additional explanation, but the decision definitely points out the presence of this fact from another source besides the 
plaintiff. Here, Venable is the only person providing testimony for her stated reason for the termination, and her 
testimony is mere speculation. 
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scintilla of evidence." See Ray, 120 Idaho at 121, 814 P .2d at 21. The plaintiff in Ray had 
survived the motion by presenting more than "mere allegations." Id. Here, Venable can only 
point to mere allegations in the record to support her opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment. 
Overall, unlike the circumstances in Ray analyzed above, reasonable minds could not 
come to different conclusions concerning the reason Venable's employment was terminated. See 
Ray, 120 Idaho at 121,814 P.2d at 21. Based on the present record, no reasonable mind would 
conclude that Venable's employment was terminated for reasons of refusal to participate in 
alleged unlawful acts, or reporting such acts to management. Therefore, the record supports a 
finding that Venable cannot prove a causal link between her termination and her allegations of 
refusing to participate in unlawful acts or reporting them to management. 
B. Venable is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal 
Venable has argued that should she be the prevailing party on appeal, she would be 
entitled to attorney fees pursuant to I.e. § 12-120(3). According to Idaho Code § 12-120(3): 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
(Emphasis added.) "The crucial test in determining whether a civil action arose out of a 
commercial transaction is whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the 
lawsuit; it must be integral to the claim and constitute the basis upon which the party is 
attempting to recover." Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 432, 196 P.3d 341,350 (2008). 
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"Where an action is one to recover in a commercial transaction, that claim triggers the 
application of section 12-120(3) and the prevailing party may recover fees 'regardless of the 
proof that the commercial transaction did in fact occur.'" Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 
145 Idaho 408, 415, 179 P.3d 1064, 1017 (2008). 
On appeal, a prevailing party will be eligible for an award of attomey fees when it 
correctly cites the applicable authorities and properly applies those authorities to its case. See 
Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 805, 241 P.3d 972, 978 (2010). Here, Venable failed to 
properly explain how an award of fees is applicable to her claim for wrongful discharge in 
violation of public policy. She has cited to the statute, but also cites to authority that supports an 
award for a different cause of action-breach of an employment contract. She does not elaborate 
how the statute or authority supporting an award for a different cause of action applies to her 
circumstances. Without doing so, an award for fees is not properly supported, and her argument 
must fail if she were found to be the prevailing party. 
e. Internet Auto is Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal 
1. Internet Auto is entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.e. § 12-
120(3). 
Internet Auto is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-
120(3). As stated above, an award under the code section is appropriate for a prevailing party in 
any civil action to recover on any commercial transaction. I.e. § 12-120(3). Claims for 
termination of employment at will in violation of public policy have been held to be contract 
actions subject to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). See Stout v. Key Training Corp., 144 
Idaho 195, 198, 158 P.3d 971,974 (2007); Hummer v. Evans, 129 Idaho 274, 280, 923 P.2d 981, 
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987 (1996). This action is an appeal from the district court's determination of Venable's 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim and Internet Auto's defense of that claim. 
Should Internet Auto be found to be the prevailing party on appeal, it is entitled to its reasonable 
attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I. C. § 12-120(3). 
2. Internet Auto is entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.e. § 12-121. 
Internet Auto is also entitled to an award of attorney fees on this appeal, based on the 
well-established case law interpreting Idaho Code § 12-121. If an appeal "merely invites the 
Court to reweigh the evidence or second guess the lower court" or if the appeal was brought or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, an award of fees pursuant to I.C. 
§ 12-121 is appropriate. Belstier v. Sheier, 151 Idaho 819, 827, 264 P.3d 926, 934 (2011). 
Internet Auto contends it is entitled to fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 for two separate reasons. 
First, Venable has essentially asked the COUli to reweigh the evidence presented on 
summary judgment (and the first and second motions for reconsideration). Although the district 
cOUli clearly and specifically ruled in its three decisions on the issue that Venable cannot survive 
summary judgment by relying on mere allegations or a mere scintilla of evidence, Venable 
pursued this appeal arguing that these same conclusory asseliions of a refusal to participate in 
unlawful sales practices presented a genuine issue of fact to withstand summary judgment. 
Asking the Court to reweigh the evidence is an impermissible use of an appeal and a waste of 
judicial resources; accordingly, an award of fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 is appropriate. 
Next, one of the facts Venable cites as support for her arguments on appeal no longer 
supports her arguments. Venable argues on appeal that the fact that her access to key sales 
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programs was restricted illustrates the fact that her subsequent termination was based on her 
complaints related to unlawful practices and her refusal to participate in those practices. 
(Appellant's Br., p. 19.) However, Venable previously conceded prior to appeal that the access 
was in no way related to her alleged complaints of unlawful practices or refusal to participate in 
those practices. At the hearing for the second motion for reconsideration, Venable conceded this 
fact and the district court memorialized it in its decision. (R., Vol. 1., p. 440.) Venable now 
attempts to resunect that fact and use it in support of her appeal. Venable has pursued her appeal 
without foundation by using this fact as support, and such use is an appropriate reason to award 
Internet Auto attorney fees under I. C. § 12-121. Venable brought and pursued this appeal 
frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation, using as support a fact she conceded below. 
Therefore, Internet Auto is entitled to costs and attorney fees on appeal. I.C. § 12-121; Belstler, 
151 Idaho at 827,264 P.3d at 934. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons stated herein, Venable has failed to prove at any stage of the 
summary judgment proceedings that Internet Auto's reasons for terminating her employment ran 
contrary to public policy. Although the district court consistently ruled that Venable failed to 
submit sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment, she continued to pursue her claim that 
she had engaged in a protected activity by refusing to commit an unlawful act and that the 
termination was motivated by her refusal. Her claim is only based on mere allegations; she did 
not meet her burden on summary judgment of showing sufficient evidence to create a genuine 
issue of material fact. The district court was correct in granting Internet Auto's motion for 
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summary judgment regarding Venable's claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy. Internet Auto respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court and grant 
Internet Auto its reasonable attorney fees and costs in defending this appeal. 
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